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AGENCY-1959 TENNESSEE SURVEY
KENNETH L. ROBERTS*




A. Servant and Subservant
B. Sheriffs Liability for Acts of Deputies
III. CREATIoN OF AGENCY RELATiONSIP
I. LIABIITY OF MASTER TO SERVANT
A. Common Law
Several decisions of the Tennessee and sixth federal circuit appellate
courts during the survey period dealt with the nature and scope of
duties owing by master to servant. A prefatory review of applicable
common law principles should aid understanding of these cases.
Broadly categorized, the master's common law obligations to his
servant are fivefold. (1) To afford a reasonably safe place to work.'
The servant must be protected from dangers known to the master or
those which might have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable
diligence. If the danger is known or patently obvious and appreciated
by the servant, he may be found to have assumed the risk.2 (2) To
initially furnish reasonably safe appliances, tools and implements.
Supplying instruments known to be dangerous to the user or other
servants, or which could have been so known by reasonable inspection,
constitutes a breach of the master's duty. Again, the servant may
assume the risk of obvious defects.3 (3) As an alternative to the first-
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee bar.
1. Moore Coal Co. v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 516, 64 S.W.2d 3 (1933); Casey-
Hedges Co. v. Gates, 139 Tenn. 282, 201 S.W. 760 (1917); Griffin & Son v.
Parker, 129 Tenn. 446, 164 S.W. 1142 (1914); Smith v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co.,
115 Tenn. 543, 92 S.W. 62 (1905); Virginia Iron Co. v. Hamilton, 107 Tenn. 705, 65
S.W. 401 (1901); Duncan v. Dickie Rector Lumber Co., 31 Tenn. App. 155, 212
S.W.2d 908 (1948).
2. E.g., Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Brown, 158 Tenn. 75, 12 S.W.2d 381
(1928); Acme Box Co. v. Gregory, 119 Tenn. 537, 105 S.W. 350 (1907); Iron
Co. v. Pace, 101 Tenn. 476, 48 S.W. 232 (1898); Tennessee Cent. Ry. v. Shack-
lett, 24 Tenn. App. 563, 147 S.W.2d 1054 (1940); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Pollard, 14 Tenn. App. 388 (1931). A fuller discussion of the doctrine of
assumption of the risk is had below.
3. See generally, Jessie v. Chattanooga Golf & Country Club, 173 Tenn. 536,
121 S.W. 557 (1938); Memphis St. Ry. v. Stockton, 143 Tenn. 201, 226 S.W.
1107 (1920); Carey Roofing & Mfg. Co. v. Black, 129 Tenn. 30, 164 S.W. 1183
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mentioned obligation, the master must warn the servant-'of the risks
of unsafe conditions or dangers, existing or impending, of which the
former knows or should discover by the exercise of proper ,care, and
which he should realize that the servant may not discover by the
exercise of due care.4 Warning may not be required where the danger
is obvious.5 (4) To provide a suitable number of competent fellow
servants.6 (5) Where the nature of the work demands it, the master
may be under an obligation to promulgate and enforce safety regula-
tions 'for the conduct of employees.7 In fulfilling these responsibilities,
the master must conduct his business in the light of knowledge which
he has, and of that which is attributable to him because of superior
attainments.8 He may be under a duty to know the human nature of
his servants, and to foresee the probable occurrence of sporadic
negligent acts.9 The standard imposed upon the master is one of
reasonable care-he is not an insurer.10
The above obligations are commonly denominated "absolute," "con-
tinuing," and "nondelegable." That is, they may be delegated to
another, but liability for improper conduct of the delegatee continues
with the mastern
(1913); Virginia Iron Co. v. Hamilton, 107 Tenn. 705, 65 S.W. 401 (1901);
Morriss Bros. v. Bowers, 105 Tenn. 59, 58 S.W. 328 (1900); Guthrie v. Louis-
ville & N. R.R., 79 Tenn. 372 (1883). See also 4 VAND. L. REV. 372 (1951).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 492 (1958) provides that the master
has no duty to use care to make conditions safe if he warns the servant of
the dangers, except (a) where required by statute; (b) where the servant is
not himself free to choose; (c) where it is understood that the master is to
assume the risk. If the servant is of a class who would normally know the
conditions, or if he represents himself as one who would discover the defects,
then the master is under no duty to warn him unless the master knows that
in spite of appearances the servant is unfamiliar with the conditions and will
not realize the risks. For a unique case presenting the question of the em-
ployer's duty to warn employees of danger, see Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956), and comment, O'Neal, Agency
-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV. 972, 977 (1957). See also Pierce v.
United States, 142 F.Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); Moon v. Chattanooga,
10 Tenn. App. 82 (1929).
5. MEcHEM, OUTLINES Or AGENCY §§ 581-82 (4th ed. 1952).
6. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Welch, 247 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1957), and com-
ment,. Hayes, Agency-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VAND. L. REV. 1168, 1172
(1958).
7. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 67-69 (2d ed. 1955).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 495 (1958).
9. Id. § 493.
10. For good general discussions of the principles set forth in the above
textual paragraph see MEcnEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 578 (4th ed. 1952);
PROSSER, TORTS §§ 67-69 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 492
(1958).
11. Smith v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 115 Tenn. 543, 92 S.W. 62 (1905);
Guthrie v. Louisville & N. R.R., 79 Tenn. 372 (1883); MECHEM, OUTLINES OF
AGENCY § 585 (4th ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 492 (1958).
This principle is a complement to the fellow servant rule, discussed more
fully below. Though a master is not, under common law principles, liable for
the negligent act of a fellow servant which injures another servant, this is
generally so only when the fellow servant is negligent in the performance
of acts not involving a violation of the master's nondelegable duties. As to
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By accepted doctrine, these duties are not confined to the precise
period during which services are actually rendered but exist while the
servant can properly be said to be acting within the scope or course
of his employment, actual or "constructive." A servant in a place or
vehicle in the control of the master, in which he is then required to be
by reason of his employment or which has been provided for use
incidental to his employment, is due the above duties. Travel to and
from employment may be within the scope.12
A master who has met these obligations is not rendered liable by
injuries to a servant resulting from risks "incident to the business"
-those which result from no fault of the master but from the very
nature of the thing to be done.13 However, the line of demarcation
between such a risk and one involving a breach of the master's duty
is indeed delicate.
Turning to the recent decisions, in Overstreet v. Norman,14 a 51
year-old woman was employed by defendant as a "bean picker." Trans-
portation was afforded her in defendant's pick-up truck. Plaintiff
rode in the bed of the truck, some four feet above ground. Upon
arrival at the field, an unknown party placed a bean hamper at the
rear of the truck for use as a step. As plantiff stepped down, the
hamper turned, she fell and suffered injuries. She sought recovery,
alleging a breach of common law duty by her employer proximately
resulting in her injuries; 5 specifically, that defendant was negligent
in failing to provide her with a safe place to work and safe appliances
by not providing steps for alighting from the truck. Two of the com-
mon law trinity of masters' defenses were interposed by defendant-
that plaintiff had assumed the risk; and that the negligence, if any,
was that of a fellow servant for which defendant was not responsible.
There was a jury verdict for plaintiff for $200.00.16 On appeal, this
was affirmed by the middle section of the court of appeals. In a
logical, well-reasoned opinion, Judge Felts adhered to the general
principles set out above. He felt that since defendant was transporting
plaintiff to her place of work in his truck, she was at that time
"constructively" in his employment and was thus owed a duty of
these, the master is generally responsible for the injurious acts of both him-
self and the fellow servant. In short, a servant performing the nondelegable
duties of a master is not a fellow servant within the meaning of that rule.
See Virginia Iron Co. v. Hamilton, 107 Tenn. 705, 65 S.W. 401 (1901).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 497 (1958).
13. See MEcHEm, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 576 (4th ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), AGENCY § 499 (1958).
14. 314 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957). See also the survey of Torts,
this issue, 12 VAD L. REV. 1350 (1959).
15. Coverage under Workmen's Compensation was not alleged. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-906 (1956) provides that "The Workmen's Compensation Law shall
not apply to: (c) . . . farm or agriculture laborers and employers thereof."
16. And for her husband for approximately $800.00 for loss of consortium.
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due care though she had not commenced work at the moment of
injury; this duty encompassed the furnishing of safe means for
alighting from the truck; and, the duty being nondelegable, the fact
that the act of negligence in placing the hamper may have been that of
a fellow servant did not relieve defendant of responsibility.
The question of whether plaintiff had assumed the risk presented
little difficulty. The preferred statement of that doctrine is:
In the absence of a statute or an agreement to the contrary, a master is
not liable to a servant for harm caused by the unsafe conditions of the
employment, if the servant, with knowledge of the facts and understand-
ing of the risks, voluntarily enters or continues in the employment.'?
(Emphasis added.)
Of course, if the risk is an obvious one, the servant may be held to
have known it.18 It should be noted that this doctrine rests upon a
subjective state of mind, as contrasted with the objective test used to
determine if the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.19
Applying these principles, it seems entirely sound to conclude that
plaintiff could be found not to have known and appreciated the
dangers inherent in stepping on the hamper; thus, the jury conclusion
that she had not assumed the risk seems properly substainable.
Similar problems were discussed in Armour & Co., Inc. v. Mitchell,2 0
by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. One Mitchell was employed to
"bone meat" for defendant Armour. His work necessitated that he
remain in a "cooler room" where the temperatures ranged from 29 to
38 degrees, to be near a freezer room in which the temperature was
10 degrees below zero and from which cold air circulated about his
feet, and to pass between the cooler room and an outside platform to
assist in unloading trucks. Bronchitis and congestion of the lungs
were the cumulative effects of these exposures. In an action predicated
upon the theory of breach of duty by the master in failing to furnish
a safe place to work, Armour defended on the grounds of assumption
of risk, contributory negligence, and the bar of the Tennessee one-year
statute of limitations.21 The jury found for plaintiff for $12,000.00. In a
per curiam opinion, the federal court stated that it could not be held
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 521 (1958). See also Moon v. Chat-
tanooga, 10 Tenn. App. 82 (1929).
18. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Brown, 158 Tenn. 75, 12 S.W.2d 381 (1928).
19. If a reasonably prudent servant would have learned the facts, appre-
ciated the risks and acted accordingly, his negligence proximately contributing
to his injury may bar his recovery. Assumption of the risk however can
only be invoked when the servant subjectively knew and appreciated the
risks. See generally PROSSER, TORTS, § 68 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMTENT (SEc-
OND), AGENCY § 525 (1958). Sometimes the distinction between the two
doctrines is not clearly drawn. See Urmann v. City of Nashville, 311 S.W.2d
618 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
20. 262 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1958).
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (1956).
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as a matter of law that plaintiff either knew and appreciated the
dangers of his employment so as to have assumed the risk by con-
tinuing work under these conditions; or, that a reasonably prudent
person in plaintiff's position would have acted differently, so as to
constitute his acts as contributory negligence. Thus, these questions
being properly for the triers of fact, the jury verdict was affirmed.p
The result seems both theoretically sound and socially desirable.
As for the statute of limitations, the tort was deemed a contin-
uing one as to which the statute did not begin to run while the
negligence continued or until termination of employment. This accords
with Tennessee doctrine in similar cases.2
Though decided upon other principles of law,24 Williams v. McEl-
haney25 contained some interesting comments upon the fellow servant
rule as a defense to the master. Generally stated, that doctrine re-
lieves a master from liability to the servant if the former has not been
negligent in the selection of his servants and the plaintiff-servant, act-
ing in the course of his employment or in connection therewith, is
injured solely by a fellow servant who is performing acts not in viola-
tion of the master's nondelegable duties.28 Fellow servants within the
rule are those employed by a common master in the same household or
a single enterprise and who are so related in their work that, because
of proximity or otherwise, there is a special risk of harm to one of
them if the other is negligent.27 Though similarity of work is not the
controlling test, the fact that two servants are engaged in a common
employment and thrown into frequent contact with each other is a
22. Had plaintiff been found to have assumed the risk, the fact that he may
have been forced to continue his employment under such conditions out of
economic necessity is, by orthodox dogma, of no moment. The authorities
generally agree that in such a situation the servant cannot plead economic
pressure or coercion as an excusing factor, nor is the fact that the servant is
obeying specific orders of the master of any avail except as it bears upon the
question of realization of the risk. See MECHEM, OUTLINES or AGENCY § 595
(4th ed. 1952); PROSSER, TORTS, § 68 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 523 (1958).
23. See, e.g., Hercules Powder Co. v. Bannister, 171 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.
1948); Goodall Co. v. Sartin, 141 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1944); Steiner v. Spencer,
24 Tenn. App. 389, 145 S.W.2d 547 (1940). See also Hutton, Statute of Limita-
tions and Radiation Injury, 23 TENN. L. REV. 278, 282 (1954).
24. For a full discussion of this case and the main points raised therein,
see the survey article on Contracts, this issue, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1110 (1959).
25. 315 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. 1958).
26. Maness v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 128 Tenn. 143, 162 S.W. 1105 (1913);
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Handman, 81 Tenn. 423 (1884); Fox v. Sandford,
36 Tenn. 36 (1856); McKNEY, FELLOW SERVANTS 1-23 (1896); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), AGENCY § 474 (1958). See the discussion in footnote 11, supra, as
to the relationship between the concept of the master's nondelegable duties
and the fellow servant rule. The Restatement further provides that the
fellow servant rule does not operate to relieve the master if the servant was
coerced or deceived into serving or was too young to appreciate the risks, or
was employed in violation of statute.
27. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 589 (4th ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND), AGENCY §§ 475-78 (1958).
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significant factor in determining the relationship.2 8 Tennessee follows
the minority restriction that the rule does not apply when the negli-
gence is that of a vice principal or a superior servant, i.e., one who is
charged by the master with the performance of his common law
duties towards the plaintiff-servant.29
These principles were reiterated by Justice Burnett of the supreme
court in the Williams case. He deemed it "entirely inferable" that
the rule did not apply where the plaintiff, employed as a carpenter,
was knocked from a truck by overhanging wires due to the negligent
driving of another servant of defendant, an ordinary laborer. Primary
emphasis was placed upon the fact that the two servants were not
engaged in a common employment and their contact with each other
was infrequent and unnecessary.
B. Statutory Modiftcations
It is common knowledge that such statutes as employer's liability
and workmen's compensation acts have abolished or modified the
common law defenses available to the master in many such cases.
Therefore, the essential issue often becomes the extent to which a
statute is applicable. In Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R.R. v. Underwood,30
a question was presented as to coverage under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act.3' There, plaintiff Underwood suffered skin irritations
from being near or in contact with creosote and other chemicals
used on railroad ties. After unsuccessful medical treatment, this
developed into contact dermatitis. Knowing of the plaintiff's condition,
the railroad required him to return to work under the same conditions
without any protective clothing or other safety devices to protect him
against renewal and aggravation of his injuries. In a suit under the
act, the jury awarded Underwood $18,000.00 in damages. This was
affirmed by the federal court of appeals. It was deemed settled law
that coverage under the act is not limited to injuries resulting from
accidents, but includes occupational diseases such as silicosis and con-
tact dermatitis.3 The defendant breached its duty to furnish a safe
28. See, e.g., Louisville & N. R.R. v. Dillard, 114 Tenn. 240, 86 S.W. 313
(1904).
29. See Marshall v. South Pittsburgh Lumber & Coal Co., 164 Tenn. 267,
47 S.W.2d 553 (1931); Allen v. Chamberlain, 134 Tenn. 438, 183 S.W. 1034 (1915);
Smith v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 115 Tenn. 543, 92 S.W. 62 (1905); Louisville
& N. R.R. v. Dillard, 114 Tenn. 240, 86 S.W. 313 (1904); Ohio River & C. Ry. v.
Edwards, 111 Tenn. 31, 76 S.W. 897 (1903); Chattanooga Elec. Ry. v. Lawson,
101 Tenn. 406, 47 S.W. 489 (1898); Allen v. Goodwin, 92 Tenn. 385, 21 S.W.
760 (1893); Urmann v. Nashville, 311 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957);
Pikeville Fuel Co. v. Marsh, 34 Tenn. App. 82, 232 S.W. 2d 789 (1948); 4 VAND.
L. REv. 713 (1951).
30. 262 F.2d 375 (6th Cir. 1958).
31. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
32. E.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (silicosis); Young v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 197 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1952) (contact dermatitis).
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place to work and proper equipment. 3 Although the opinion does not
indicate the nature of the defenses raised by the railroad, assumption
of the risk by the plaintiff is no longer a defense to the employer in
such a suit.34 And, though contributory negligence of the plaintiff
could result in a diminution of damages recoverable by him on a com-
parative negligence basis, 35 the Supreme Court of the United States
has recently indicated its strong convictions that such issues should
be tried by the jury,6 and a jury verdict should be upheld if there is
any substantial evidence to support it.
II. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
A. Servant and Subservant
The case of Doane Agricultural Service v. Coleman, 7 decided by the
federal appellate court, presents some extremely interesting questions
of agency law. The opinion evokes discussion of the principles of
respondeat superior, subagency and subservice, and the distinctions
between independent contractors and servants. The complex factual
situation will be set out in some detail before analysis is attempted.
Hughes, the owner of a stock farm, entered into a contract with
Doane Agricultural Service, a corporation, for management of the
farm operations. By this agreement, Doane was given the right to
hire and fire all employees and to supervise their work; to collect all
revenues and pay all expenses; to determine all matters of crop
growth, soil conservation, soil and crop rotation and similar problems;
to make plans for the maintenance, repair and removal of buildings,
subject to approval by the owner, Hughes. Doane was to receive a
monthly fee. Wages of employees were to be paid out of the farm's
bank account by checks drawn by an employee of Doane. Doane was
obliged to report periodically upon the progress of the work and con-
dition of the farm. The overall plan of operation was to be submitted
to Hughes for his approval. The contract further provided that it was
not to be the whole agreement between the parties but was to serve
only as a broad general outline of their understandings.
Guarr was the farm manager. It was found that he had been em-
33. See Thurmer v. Southern Ry., 293 S.W.2d 600 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956);
O'Neal, Agency-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAm. L. REV. 973, 976 (1957).
Also, Southern Ry. v. Welch, 247 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1957).
34. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1952). See Thomas v. Union Ry.,
216 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1954).
35. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1952).
36. Rodgers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1956). See also Osborne v.
Nashville, 182 Tenn. 197, 185 S.W.2d 510 (1944); LaFollette Coal, Iron & Ry.
Co. v. Minton, 117 Tenn. 415, 101 S.W. 178 (1906) (questions of negligence and
contributory negligence are for the jury unless evidence is susceptible of only
one fair inference).
37. 254 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1958).
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ployed by Doane and this subsequently approved by Hughes. Mitchell
was a farm hand who had been originally employed by Hughes and
retained by Doane.
Guarr contracted with one Blaylock, an independent contractor,n
to bale hay; the latter's employee, Coleman, was sent to perform the
job. While Coleman was on a tractor engaged in baling, Guarr decided
that the bales were not being properly formed and ordered Coleman
to make adjustments and Mitchell, a man inexperienced in tractor
operation, to run the machine. Coleman complied and while making
the necessary mechanical adjustments suffered the loss of his right
arm. Though there was some dispute as to how this came about, the
jury found that this was through the negligence of Mitchell, apparently
in failing to disengage the tractor clutch at the proper time.
Upon these facts, Coleman sought recovery both from Doane on the
theory that it was responsible for the negligence of Guarr and Mitchell
and from Hughes alleging him to be responsible for the acts of Doane
and its employees "under the law of agency."3 9 Hughes and Doane
defended on the grounds of contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, and that Coleman's injury was caused by the negligence of a
fellow servant. There was a jury verdict for Coleman which on appeal
was affirmed.
The defenses raised may be disposed of in short fashion. The fellow
servant rule is not applicable. Coleman was an employee of Blaylock,
the independent contractor, while Guarr and Mitchell were the
servants of either Doane or Hughes or both. There was no common
master.40 There was no indication that Blaylock had any control
whatsoever over Mitchell. And it seems reasonable to conclude that
Coleman had no actual knowledge or appreciation of the risk of injury
since he had requested Mitchell to disengage the clutch on the machine
and had no indication that Mitchell would not comply with this re-
quest. Therefore, Coleman could be found not to have assumed the
risk. As for contributory negligence, there was evidence to support
the jury verdict that Coleman had not been lacking in due care.
More difficult questions are presented by the attempt to resolve the
interrelationship of the parties. Under what theories of agency can
Hughes, Doane, or both be deemed liable to the injured third party,
Coleman?
First, as to the relationship of Doane to Guarr and Mitchell. Doane
employed them to perform services on the farm. Their physical con-
duct was subject to a right of control possessed by Doane. The rela-
38. This fact was not in dispute.
39. Instant case at 42.




tionship of master and servant is applicable.41 By principles settled
for over 250 years, the doctrine of respondeat superior would render
Doane liable for the torts of Guarr and Mitchell committed within their
course of employment.4 2 The acts of the latter were of the nature
which they were employed to perform, they occurred within author-
ized time and space limits, and they were actuated by a purpose to
serve the master. They seem clearly within the scope of employment.
4 3
Thus, nothing else appearing, it seems quite correct to hold Doane
liable to Coleman under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Of what effect is the agreement between Hughes and Doane? If it
created the relationship of principal-independent contractor, orthodox
doctrine has it that the principal, Hughes, would not be liable to third
persons for harm resulting from the conduct of the independent con-
tractor, Doane, or its servants44 On the other hand, if the relationship
created be said to be that of master and servant 45 two questions arise:
(1) conceding Guarr and Mitchell to be servants of Doane, can Hughes
as master of Doane be responsible to Coleman for their acts? (2) if so,
can Doane also be held? The court gave an affirmative answer to both
questions. As will be pointed out, such a result seems theoretically
sound only if the following line of reasoning is employed: Doane was
the servant of Hughes; Guarr and Mitchell were subservants, whose
tortious acts within the scope of their employment bind both Doane
and Hughes under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Assuming the
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 2 (1958) provides: "A servant is an
agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical
conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the
right to control by the master." See also MEcHEM, OuTNEs OF AGENCY § 13
(4th ed. 1952). It is settled in Tennessee that this right to control physical
actions is the primary factor creating the relationship of master and servant.
See Barker v. Curtis, 199 Tenn. 413, 287 S.W.2d 43 (1955); D. M. Rose & Co.
v. Snyder, 185 Tenn. 499, 206 S.W.2d 897 (1947); Mayberry v. Boan Air Chem.
Co., 160 Tenn. 459, 26 S.W.2d 148 (1929); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Huffman & Weakley,
155 Tenn. 580, 297 S.W. 199 (1927); Finley v. Keisling, 151 Tenn. 464, 270 S.W.
629 (1924).
42. See Howard v. Haven, 198 Tenn. 572, 281 S.W.2d 480 (1954); National
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 179 Tenn. 29, 162 S.W.2d 501 (1941); FERsoN,
PnwcnILEs OF AGENCY § 25 (1954); MECHEm, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 349 (4th
ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 216, 219. See also Comment,
24 TENN. L. REV. 241 (1956).
43. For a discussion of the concept "scope of employment," see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 228-29 (1958). See also Southern Ry. v. Jones, 228
F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1955); Anderson v. Covert, 193 Tenn. 238, 245 S.W.2d 770
(1952); Terry v. Burford, 131 Tenn. 451, 468, 175 S.W. 538 (1914); 22 TENN.
L. REV. 558 (1952); 12 TENN. L. REV. 305 (1934).
44. FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 34 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY §§ 2, 250 (1958); Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer
of an Independent Contractor, 10 IND. L.J. 494, 499 (1935). See also National Life
& Ace. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 179 Tenn. 29, 162 S.W.2d 501 (1941); Knight v.
Hawkins, 26 Tenn. App. 448, 173 S.W.2d 163 (1941).
45. That a corporation such as Doane might properly be designated a
"servant," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 14(m) and Explanatory
Notes thereto.
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soundness of the ultimate result, inquiry will be made as to whether
the facts support the above rationale.
An independent contractor is one who contracts to do something for
another but who is not subject to the right of control by that other with
respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking,
as is a servant. Unlike the servant, the independent contractor is en-
gaged in an enterprise of his own. Recalling the provisions of the
above contract and the "practical construction" thereof by the parties,
the following factors tend to indicate that Doane was an independent
contractor: Doane had rather broad supervisory powers as to hiring
and firing of employees, supervision of work, collection of revenues
and making of disbursements, and in dealing with crops. This indicates
freedom from the control of Hughes. Too, Doane was engaged in the
distinct business of farm management and could be considered a
specialist which operated without detailed supervision. The composite
operation of Doane would seem to require certain precise skills. There
was no agreement that the work could not be delegated by Doane.
Conversely, certain factors weigh towards the designation of Doane
as a servant. For example, Hughes specifically reserved the right to
control decisions as to maintenance, repair and removal of buildings
by requiring that Doane report back to him as to such undertakings;
Doane was required to make periodic reports as to the progress of the
work and condition of the farm; and the overall plan of operation was
subject to Hughes' approval. The fact that the contract was, by its
terms, not the complete agreement between the parties would tend
to indicate the retention of certain powers by Hughes. Though the
facts are unclear as to which party supplied the instrumentalities of
work, the locus was the farm of Hughes. That the period of employ-
ment and termination thereof were left unsettled indicates a reserva-
tion of power in Hughes to terminate the employment at any time.
The fact that Doane was to be paid on a monthly basis lends some fur-
ther support to the servant classification. And the work could be
deemed part of a regular business of Hughes. Certainly, employment
was in one specific area.
46
46. For general discussion of the concept independent contractor and the
distinction between that status and servant, see FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY
§ 39 (1954); MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY §§ 427-31 (4th ed. 1952); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 2, 220 (1958); O'Neal, Agency-956 Tennessee
Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 918, 922 (1956); Ferson, Agency-1954 Tennessee
Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV. 749, 752 (1954). See also Bowaters So. Paper Co. v.
Brown, 253 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1958); Bush Bros. v. Hickey, 223 F.2d 425 (6th
Cir. 1955); Terry v. Memphis Stone & Gravel Co., 222 F.2d 652 (6th Cir.
1955); Kamarad v. Parkes, 201 Tenn. 566, 300 S.W.2d 922 (1957); Barker v.
Curtis, 199 Tenn. 413, 287 S.W.2d 43 (1955); Weeks v. McConnell, 196 Tenn.
110, 264 S.W.2d 573 (1953); Brademeyer v. Chickasaw Bldg. Co., 190 Tenn.
239, 229 S.W.2d 323 (1950); D. M. Rose & Co. v. Snyder, 185 Tenn. 499, 206
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The general view is that the triers of fact are to consider and bal-
ance such factors and determine the nature of the relationship. As the
circumstances of this case clearly demonstrate, such questions are not
susceptible of automatic, slide rule type treatment. The process is
more complex. By finding Hughes liable to Coleman, the triers to be
theoretically sound must have found their mental scales more heavily
weighted towards designation of Hughes as master of Doane. The
facts are capable of supporting such a conclusion, and if the precarious
assumption is made that the jury employed the above rationale in
arriving at the result, it seems a proper one.
Determination of the relationship of Guarr and Mitchell to Hughes
necessitates a consideration of the principles of subagency and sub-
service. This area of agency is much confused, both in Tennessee and
elsewhere. Only in the second edition of the Restatement of Agency,
published in 1958, did the American Law Institute discuss the concept
of subservice. In the opinion of the writer, the Restatement (Second)
presents a clear and accurate analysis of these principles, and its view-
point is adopted and relied upon in the ensuing discussion.
When an agent is authorized to appoint someone to act solely on
account of the principal and thereafter the appointee is not to be the
representative of the agent but the principal, the sounder view is that
the relationship of subagency is not created, although this term is com-
monly and confusingly misapplied.4 7 In such a situation, the appoint-
ing agent would not be responsible for the acts of the appointee.
Rather, the relationship of principal and agent exists between the
principal and the appointee, and the usual results of that relationship
flow therefrom. However, if the appointing agent is to perform an
act, and may do so either by himself or through another, and the ap-
pointee of the agent is doing the act both on account of the principal
and as agent of the appointing agent, then the appointee is properly
designated a subagent.48 A subagent by this definition may bind the
principal in his relationships with third parties as if the agent had
performed the act; and since the subagent is also the agent of the
appointing agent, he may also bind the latter by acts within the scope
of his employment which adversely affect third parties.49 If the sub-
S.W.2d 897 (1947); Chapman v. Evans, 37 Tenn. App. 166, 261 S.W.2d 132
(1953).
47. The Tennessee cases, though somewhat unclear, tend to misapply the
term in this manner. See, e.g., Strong v. Stewart & Bros., 56 Tenn. 108, 148
(1872) ("[T]he agent is not responsible for the acts or omissions of the substi-
tute [subagent], but the subagent would himself be directly responsible to the
principal .... ."); Campbell & Co. v. Reeves & Breman, 40 Tenn. 226 (1859);
Armstrong v. Bowman, 21 Tenn. App. 673, 115 S.W.2d 229 (1937).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 5 (1958) and Explanatory Notes
thereto. See also MEcHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 79 (4th ed. 1952).
49. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY §§ 142, 362 (1958).
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agent is also under the control of the agent and the principal as to his
physical conduct, he can then be denominated a servant as to the
agent and a subservant as to the principal, both of whom would then
be masters. Though some conceptual difficulty arises out of such a
designation when the "control" test is confronted (how can two
masters control the same act of one person at the same time?), the
Restatement (Second) provides for such a classification in the follow-
ing language:
5(e). The situations in which there may be a subservant relation are
relatively rare but may exist where a person is paid by the piece or job
and is allowed by the master to select assistants at his own expense, it
being understood that the servant is to direct the conduct of the sub-
servant who is to be subject also to the superior power of control which
the master may exercise. If this superior control is not exercised, both
the master and the servant are liable to third persons for torts of the
subservant within the scope of employment for which the servant is
indemnitor to the master. For this purpose, both are masters of the
subservant.
5(f). A subservant committing a tort in the scope of employment
subjects both his employer and the latter's master to liability, his em-
ployer having a right of indemnity against him and a duty of indemnity
in favor of the master of both of them. 0
Applying these principles to the facts, it is felt that the result
reached is consistent only with the designation of Guarr and Mitchell
as servants of Doane and subservants of Hughes. Although there is a
deviation from the principles of 5 (e) above to the extent that Doane
was not paid "by the piece or job," and did not select these assistants
"at his own expense," these factors seem not to be mandatory, but
serve only as indicia of the relationship. The court concerned itself
primarily with the control reserved by Hughes and Doane, and this
seems to be the basic test.
While no issue is taken with the ultimate result reached by the
court, it is submitted that the above is the only proper rationale upon
which liability of both Hughes and Doane to Coleman can be predi-
cated. Unfortunately, the court beclouds its logic by the use of am-
bignous and imprecise language. One faced with a similar problem
would not be assisted to any great degree by knowing that Doane was
held liable because "a principal does for himself what he does through
another,"51 or that Hughes was responsible "under the law of
agency."5' Too, the court contradicted itself on one point. Doane had
urged the principle that "an agent has no responsibility for the acts
50. See also id. §§ 362, 406; MEcHEm, OUTLINEs OF AGENCY § 444 (4th ed.
1952); Seavey, Subagents and Subservants, 68 HARv. L. REv. 658 (1955).
51. Instant case at 43, citing Gulf Refining Co. v. Huffman & Weakley, 155
Tenn. 580, 297 S.W. 199 (1927).
52. Instant case at 42.
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of subagents."5 3 As has been mentioned, this is incorrect if the re-
lationship of subagency, properly defined, is present. However, to
circumvent Doane's contention, the court stated that since Guarr and
Mitchell were not subagents, then both Hughes and Doane could be
held. But the court righted (and contradicted) itself near the end of
the opinion when it stated:
Our views are supported by Sec. 362 of the Restatement of the Law of
Agency: "An agent is liable to third persons for the conduct of sub-agents
and of his servants under the same conditions which make a principal
liable for the conduct of an agent or servant." In its comment under
that section the American Law Institute states:
(a) "For some purposes, a sub-agent is an agent of the principal, since
he acts on the principal's account and is subject to his ultimate control
in the performance of acts done for him. He is also, however, an agent
of the agent and subjects the latter to liability within the sphere of
activity in which he is authorized to act in accordance with the rules
dealing with the liability of the principal for the conduct of an agent
stated in Sec. 212-219.
"(b) An agent employing a servant upon the principal's affairs is sub-
ject to the liability for the conduct of such a servant to the same extent
as is any master."54
One moral to be learned from this case has been admirably ex-
pressed by the eminent Professor Seavey:
Words are the tools of lawyers. They should be clean and polished.
Ambiguity makes them ineffective to convey the intended thought.
Unfortunately, the literature of agency is filled with terms which are
used in a variety of senses.5 5
It is imperative that opinions in this complicated and confusing area
of the law of agency be expressed in taut and precise language. In the
present opinion the court has failed in this.
B. Sheriff's Liability for Acts of Deputies
In State ex rel. Coffelt v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,5 6 a sheriff and
his sureties were sued for compensatory and punitive damages re-
sulting from the infliction of gunshot wounds upon plaintiff's minor
son by two deputies as the boy was fleeing from an arrest attempted
for a breach of peace threatened in the presence of the deputies. Two
questions relating to the law of agency were presented: (1) Can a
sheriff be vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of his deputies? (2)
If so, may he be made to respond in punitive as well as compensatory
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id. at 45.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY, Explanatory Notes § 5 (1958).
56. 314 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1958). See also the survey of Torts,
this issue, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1350 (1959).
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damages? Felts, J., speaking for the middle section of the court of
appeals, answered both questions affirmatively.
As to both propositions, the Tennessee law seems well-settled and
requires little comment. A sheriff may be held liable for injuries to
third persons arising from the misconduct of his deputies in the
course of their official duties "under the law of agency."57 Several
Tennessee cases have stated that this common law principle applies
only where the acts of the deputies were "by virtue of the office" and
not merely "under color of office." 58 Judge Felts said that this distinc-
tion is immaterial and that the sheriff's liability may be predicated
upon either basis wherever section 8-1920 of the Tennessee Code 59 is
applicable. That section provides:
Every official bond executed under this Code is obligatory on the princi-
pal and sureties thereon-
(3) For the use and benefit of every person who is injured, as well by
any wrongful act committed under color of his office as by the failure
to perform, or the improper or neglectful performance, of the duties
imposed by law. (Emphasis added.)
His position is supported by two previous opinions of the middle
section.60 However, it should be noted that the most recent pronounce-
ment of the supreme court relating to this point leaves it somewhat
unclear as to whether this interpretation is completely accepted.6' In
any event, the distinction was not controlling, the acts of the deputies
in shooting at the fleeing misdemeanant being deemed virtute officii.
As to the second question, several Tennessee cases have held that in
a proper case a principal may be made to respond in punitive damages
for the wrongful acts of his agent "done with a bad motive and in dis-
regard of social obligations, or where there is negligence so gross as to
amount to positive misconduct."62
57. Criticism of the imprecision inherent in this vague phrase is had in the
textual discussion of the Coleman case. Principal Tennessee cases discussing
the sheriff's liability are Jones v. State for Use of Coffey, 194, Tenn. 534, 253
S.W.2d 740 (1952); State ex rel. Blanchard v. Fisher, 193 Tenn. 147, 245 S.W.2d
179 (1951); Stephens v. Hinds, 183 Tenn. 652, 194 S.W.2d 483 (1946); Ivy v.
Osborne, 152 Tenn. 470, 279 S.W. 384 (1925). See also 22 TENN. L. REV. 1074
(1953); Comment, 21 TENN. L. REV. 306, 312 (1950).
58. E.g., the Fisher and Ivy cases, supra note 57.
59. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-1920 (1956).
60. Marable v. State ex rel. Wackernie, 32 Tenn. App. 238, 222 S.W.2d 234
(1949); State ex rel. Harbin v. Dunn, 39 Tenn. App. 190, 282 S.W.2d 203
(1943) (Felts, J.).
61. In Jones v. State for Use of Coffey, 194 Tenn. 534, 539, 253 S.W.2d 740
(1952), the Supreme Court indicates that the common law distinctions between
acts "by virtue of the office" and acts "under color of office" is applicable
except "in certain cases" where the sheriff and his sureties would be liable
if the deputy was acting "under color of office." No amplification of the nature
of these "certain cases" was had.
62. Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, 103 Tenn. 376, 389, 53 S.W. 557 (1899).
For a discussion of the situations where the master may be liable in punitive
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III. CREATION OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
Province v. Mitchell 63 contained one proposition of agency law.
When defendant's house burned her insurer sent an adjuster to in-
vestigate the damage. Upon the adjuster's request made in the pres-
ence of defendant, plaintiff contractor began repair work upon the
house and later submitted an estimate of the cost of repairs prior to
completion. This estimate was made the substantial basis of the
insurer's settlement with defendant. Defendant thereafter refused
to pay plaintiff the estimated amount for the work done, offering
to pay only the reasonable value of plaintiff's services, which was
some $400.00 less. Plaintiff sued to recover the larger amount alleging
among other things that the actions of the adjuster constituted him
the agent of the defendant in this matter and that his approval of
plaintiff's estimate followed by the settlement with defendant
amounted to a promise to pay plaintiff such amount, upon which
defendant was bound. This contention was rejected, the western
section of the court of appeals stating without citation of authority
that the adjuster was the agent of the insurance company and was not
rendered otherwise by the above circumstances.
The conclusion seems correct. There appear to have been no deal-
ings between defendant and the adjuster which would manifest an
intent that the latter was to act in behalf of the insured or subject
to her control in negotiating with the plaintiff. Rather, the adjuster
seems clearly to have been acting in behalf of the insurer which had
a substantial interest in the matter. The adjuster was in nowise sub-
ject to the will of defendant in so dealing and no element of fiduciary
relationship between the insured and the adjuster can be perceived.
64
damages for the servant's act, see Earley v. Roadway Express, 106 F.Supp.
958 (E.D. Tenn. 1952). See also on this point the interesting discussion in
Noel, Torts-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1350 (1959).
63. 312 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
64. See general discussion in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 1 (1958).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-705 (1956), which constitutes solicitors of insurance the
agents of the insurer and not the insured, with the exception of fire insurance
brokers, is not pertinent. The thrust of that section is concerned with repre-
sentations at the time of application as between solicitors and applicants. It
is not concerned with the acts of one clearly employed by the insurance com-
pany to act in its behalf, such as the adjuster here.
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